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L ET ME BEGIN by quoting-and sl ightly modifying-D escartes: 
" I do not know whether I should tell you of my meditations on 
the subject, for they are so metaphysical and so out of the ordinary 
that they may perhaps not be to everybody's taste." 1 The present 
paper is frank ly specu lative. It appears sti ll more so as 1 am 
unable to clarify- and thus substantiate-some of its contentions, 
and even some of its vocabulary. Such clarification could only be 
provided, on the one hand, by means of a reasonably complete 
ontologica l framework on which I am presently engaged,2 and on 
the other hand , by means of a certain number of scientific data, 
which are left in a so rt o f hinterland. Many of my f riends who 
have, o r boast o f having, an anti-metaphysical and analytic temper-
ament, wi ll claim that most o f what I have to say is either non-
sensical or muddled, or both. I can sympathize with these hard-
boiled souls, fo r I am myself often beset-as arc all seJf.csteeming 
philosophers today- by grave doubts on the possibility, o r the 
opportunitr, of metaphysica l and speculative stalcmcnts. Yet, I 
dare to tell rou of my medi tations because I fee l confident that if 
someone with more phi losophical talent than f could \vork them 
out carefully, they would become more palatable not only to my 
friends, but also, strange as it may seem, to myself. 
The vastness of the topic can only be matched by the disarming 
simplicity of the question. "\XIhat is man?' ' Many of the answers 
g iven thus far have been quite plain and straightforwa rd: "Man 
is a rational anima l," ''Man is a social being," "Man is a natural 
entity," "Man is a creature of God," "Man is a histo rical reality," 
1 Diuours dt Ia Mlthodt. Quatri<me Partie (AT VI .H). The corroct original text 
relds: '' l e nr ((l)' si ie doy \'OU.S entrett-nir c!tS p:e."llitres med•lltions que i'>. :ay f3ites: c2r 
olles son t si Meur,hysiques & si ~u co:nmunes, qu'clles nc scront J>C'Ut<strc pas au gowt 
cc tout lc mondc. ' 
: See my forthcomin~: book, El Str > Ia Mutrlt. Doti]Ptjo tit filoto{ill intrgrarionitta 
(M• d ricl . in point l . r• rt icubrly ch•pt<r one. These p•gcs •re r• ot ly • \'Crsion 3nd p21 tly 
• r<formul•tion of some thoutht< cont• ined • t the begrnnins of ch>pter th ree:. 
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and so on. "What is man?"' however, is not a question, but a 
whole universe of questions. And many of the :mswers given are 
deceptively easy. Thus, while the formula, "M an is a rational 
an imal," seems almost commonplace, its proper mean ing can, in 
fact, only be appraised through interminable and exasperatingly 
sophisticated d ig ressions. 
The question, then, looks rather hopeless. Fortunately philos-
ophers have one charming characteristic: they are never dismared 
by the questions. (They are on ly dismayed by the answers.) I 
will follow suit, and wi ll try to answer the questions by means of 
a sketch of philosophical anthropology. Among some of the things 
1 will maintain here is that the human being, although ind issolubly 
t ied up to the natural world, is not reducible to th is world. T o 
say this is, of course, to say next to nothing, so I will do my best 
to add something to it. 
For the sake of clarity I wi ll indicate the main steps of my 
argument. I will fi rst consider the problem of man·s body, and 
will conclude that in some sense man is his body. I will then dis-
cuss the more general problem of the relations between biological 
life and human life. The results obtained will then be formulated 
in an ontological vocabulary; on the basis of this I will proceed 
to an ontology of human existence, which will end in an attempt 
at a definition. 
Man rmd his bocly. 
For many centuries it bas been assumed that man possesses, as 
a defi ning d1aracterist ic, some "element" or "principle" substan-
tia lly different f rom his body. T his "element" or "pri nciple" has 
been given various names: ' reason·, 'spi rit', 'soul', and so on. A 
few daring thinkers even went so far as to conclude that if tbe 
clement in question were the defining characteristic of man, and 
if it did not necessari ly entail the existence of the body, then the 
latter did not belong to the essence of a human being. More 
cautious philosophers have claimed that the body is still a signifi-
cant element in man, but since it is, so they believe, an clement 
substantially d iffe rent from the rational or spiritual part, then 
there must be some way of explaining the undeniable interactions 
between soul, spirit, or reason, on the one hand, and the body, on 
the o ther hand. A host of metaphysicians, particularly since the 
time of D escartes, have spent mud1 time and ingenuity on pro-
viding elaborate explan:ttions of such interactions. 
The numerous blind-alleys up which all these philosophers-
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both daring and cautious- stumbled, led some thinkers to hoist 
the flag of naturalistic, nay materialistic, reductionism. Since man, 
they argued, is at bottom a natural being, and since natural beings 
are material entities, man's nature and activities must be thoroughly 
accounted for in terms of material organization. \Y/ e may, if we 
really wish, ta lk about mind, soul, spirit and so on, but these are 
only epiphenomena of the material body. Naturalistic and ma-
terialistic reductionism explains away the so-called "spiritual 
manifestations" as mere appearances-if not as p lain forgeries. 
My account of the philosophical controversies on the mind-
body problem is, of course, a deplorable oversimplification . But it 
may he lp us to unde rstand the nature of the difficulties encountered 
when man has been defined either as only a sou l, or as only a 
body, or as some uneasy combination of both . In contrast with 
the doctrines sketched above, some thinkers have tried to view 
man's body as both man's inalienable property and at the same 
time as something unaccountable for as a pure ly material-or, 
more specifica lly, biological-organism. Paradoxically enough, a 
few of these thinkers have been indebted to a tradition that has 
provided philosophical founJations for the Christian doctrine of 
the soul, or have even explici tly adopted this doctrine. As an 
example of the former I may cite Aristotle, when be defined the 
soul as " the form of the organic body having the power of life." 3 
As an example of the latter I may cite Saint Augustine, when he 
declared that " the way in which the body attaches to the soul . .. 
is man himself' (hoc tamen bomo est).' These opinions are quite 
similar to some of the ones I will maintain here. U nfo rtunately, 
they have been argued for obscurely o r else half-heartedly, for 
practically all of the thinkers I am now praising as my predeces-
sors have ended by defending the doctrine that there is in man 
some principle substantially different from the body. 
The first po int 1 wish to put forwa rd is this: man does not have 
a body, but is his body- his own body. Othenv ise said: mmz is 
a way of being rt body. Thus, I seem now to subscribe to natural-
istic or materialistic reductionism. I hope to be able to prove that 
I am not so rash. If my philosophical anthropology has some 
counterparts, they can be detected in sud1 works as G ilbert Ryle's 
T/;e Concept of iviind or .M. Merleau-Ponty's The Phenomenology 
•ve ''"·· 11 t • . f t 2 •27 ff . 
4 De ri:·. D••i. XXI. 10. See P~scars comment in Pe111h1; L'Omvr. de 1'11Jral, Jacques 
Chevalier. cd . (Paris. 1936) . §84 (page 847): Oeuvrn, Leon Brunschvicg, cd . . XII (Pari s, 
1925) . §72 (pp. 9 1-2). 
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of Perception.5 This does not mean that my ideas are derived 
from theirs; it on! y means that they are in tune with some of 
theirs. Like them, but with vastly different assumptions, I try to 
shun equally classical monism- spiritualistic or materialistic-and 
classical dualism-such as the one exemplified in the Cartesian 
idea of the "ghost in the machine." What I contend is this: that 
nothing can be detected in man that absolutely transcends his 
body, but yet that man is not reducible to a material substance. 
The human being is not a reality, or a cluster of realities, tmified 
by a certain element or principle existing "beyond" or "beneath" 
them. Man can be defined tentatively as his living. If man is 
formally defined as a set, he is a set whose only subset is himself. 
Biological life and human life. 
Let me put it this way: living beings-which I will henceforth 
often call "organisms"-/ive ; man, on the other hand ( or rather, 
besides), makes /;is oum /;fe . This distinction looks at first sight 
too subtle, or perhaps merely verbal. Could it not be asserted that 
organisms, above all animals, and in particular higher animals, 
also make their own life? After all , organisms behave, so to speak, 
"spontaneously." T his does not necessarily mean that their be-
havior is uncaused; it only means that it springs forth out of 
themselves and is focused upon themselves. Yet, this latter mean-
ing is not lightly to be dismissed. for it conveys the interesting 
idea that organisms possess an " inside" and an "outsicle".6 To be 
sure, "inside" and "outside" are also names of attributes of in-
organic matter. However, whereas in the latter case " inside" and 
"outside" designate spatial attributes, in the former case they 
designate behaviorial characteristics. Organisms a re capable of 
reveali ng, and of concealing, attitudes, purposes, impulses, 
emotions. Furthermore, they do that, not just accidentally, but 
constitutively. Rather than httviug an "outside" and an " inside" 
organisms are an "outside" and an " inside" . 
The words 'outside' and 'inside' designate here, so to speak, 
ultimate behavioral attributes of organisms. Organisms reveal and 
conceal themse/.t;es instead of being ··revealed" and "concealed" 
• Also . but less obviously. in Gabriel M~ rccl. j ormtrtl mhapbyJiqnr (Pari s. 1927 ). 3rd 
ed. (Paris. 1955) . pp. 221-6. 252, 261-·1 . and U myJlire de l'tlrt, vol. I (P>ris, 1951). 
pp. 162-85 (English versior1: T he Jll)'lltry o/ /Jrinl(, vol. I [London, 1950). pp. 148- 70). 
For interesting simihrities b<:tweco the phenomenolo~ical approoch anti th e •• tinf.uistic op-
prooclr/·· sec C. To)·lor ond A. ]. Ayer, " 'Pheno~nolosy and Linguistic Anolysis, • Proatd· 
111g1 o tht AriJtottliml Soritl)', supp. vo l. H (19l9) . 93·124. 
• The terms ·outside· ond "inside h3\·e herr. then . a more rodical (ond hence more 
controversia l) me;wing thon in \'Veston L:r Borre·s sentence: ""It was the first orgonism which 
fi rst brought the concepts of ·inside· and ·outside· into the universe: · (Tbc Humat: A nimal 
!Chicago, 19)-1]. p. 2 ; reprinted in Phoenix Books J>.f5 !Chicago, 1955] , p. 2) . 
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to a knowing subject, as is the case with inorganic realit ies. Organ-
isms express what they are no less than "what they are not." T hey 
are capable of deceit and of d issimulation. They express them-
selves not only impulsively, but also cunningly. In Ibis sense, 
organisms also make their own life. But the expression 'to make 
one's own life' must have a stronger meaning if it is to serve as a 
feature disti nguishing human life from biological life in geuere. 
Should we say that it easi ly acquires such a meaning when ' to make 
one's own life' means ' to behave rationally', or 'deliberately'? I 
do not think so. \VJ e have experimental proof that some higher 
animals display an impress ive amount of intelligence in their be-
havior. Not even tool-use and tool-making are exclusive attributes 
of human beings; some prehuman primates discovered that certain 
stones, sticks, and bones could be used as tools and even as tool-
making tools.: The same may be said, even if less confidently, in 
respect to language. If the term ' language' designates a set of 
signals-expressed by means of bodily behavior-to impart in-
formation , then the bees use language. If, however, ' language' 
has a stronger meaning, then its existence can be very intimately 
tied up with the human mean ing of 'making one's own life.'8 
The dirrerence between ' to live' and 'to make one's own life' 
must be based, there fore , on less controversial features. One of 
them 1 consider noteworthy: it is the one revealed through a study 
of the type of relationship hold ing between living beings and their 
world- both the inanimate and the animate world. 
All organisms develop within the frame of more or less definite 
bio logical species. Each one of the species is adapted, or becomes 
adapted, to a ce rtain "world" by means of a fi xed system of chal-
lenges and responses. The behavior of each individua l o rganism 
nts almost perfectly into the structu re of its world, to the extent 
that the latter can be defined converse! y by the set of operations 
which each ind ividual organi sm can perform within it. 
T he dependence of each individual organism on its species is 
practica lly compl ete. The ind ividual o rganism limits itself to per-
forming those actions wh ich become biological ly possible within 
the species to which it belongs. \VJben an individual organ ism 
attempts to perform actions of a quite diffe rent character, its sur-
vival as an individual is gravely impai red. If I may be permitted 
' Sec Sherwood L. \Xfos hburn, "Tools and H uman Evol ution." Srimlifir Amrriran, 203, 
No. 3 (September, 1960). 63-7 5. 
s Cf. Guc:e A. de l.ogun>. "The Ltbtllfll'tlr lnd the Cultu n l World," Tht j ournd of 
PhiloJophJ, LVII (1960) , 781. 
to use a formul a infected with Platonic rea lism, •·the species 
prevents the individual from acting otherw ise." T he well-known 
express ion ' the genius o f the species' su mmarizes metaphorically 
this a lmost consumma te adap tabi li ty. \Xf ithout such a ··genius" 
the species would peter out-or would change so radical ly as to 
become a different species. Far from making its own l ife, each 
individual o rgan ism is ··making .. a part of the life of the corres-
ponding species. T his I call "to live" simpliciter. In order to 
make its own life it would be necessary for an individual organism 
to deviate from the perpetual cycl ical movement of the species. 
If the individ ual organism succeeded withou t perishing, and if 
enough individual organisms followed suit, the species wou ld no 
longer be a species : it would be a community.3 An essentially 
di lTerent type of relation between the indi vidual organism and the 
species would then appear. f o r such an event to happen, two 
basic conditions would be required . On the one hand, the sub-
ordination of a certain number of primary impulses, among them 
the sex ual impulse, to communal needs.10 On the o ther hand, and 
quite paradoxica lly, the possibility of a further inadaptabili ty to, 
and even revo lt against, communal patterns. T hese condit ions 
w ould p rove insufficient fo r the emergence of a fu lly fl edged 
society. For such an emergence it would be necessary for the in-
d ividua l orga nism to invent and put forward new ways of life 
capable of t ransforming the behaviorial structure of the com-
munity. Then , and only then, would the individual organism 
make its own life-or have the possibility of making it. This 
happens, however, only with huma n beings. They belong to their 
community in a sense d ifferent from the one in which even pre-
human primates belonged to their species. H uman beings can, as 
a consequence, have a h istory, and not merely a temporal develop-
ment. A nd in the course of history there occur behavio ral changes 
which a re, to be sure, supported by biologica l processes, but which 
are not exclusive ly subservient to them. T o make one's own life 
requires, thus, the transcendence of biologica l cond itions. On the 
other hand, to live simpliciter looks more like sinking into li fe . 
Tnd ividual o rganisms do no t only adapt to the conditions im-
posed by their biological species ; they are also subordinated 
to the specific biolog ical world co rresponding to the species. T his 
9 I u5c the terlll$ ·commun ity• ~nd ·societ)_. in ~ sense simila r to. ~hhough not identicll 
with, the one proposed by Fcrdin1nd Tennies in Gemd111chajt untl Gtullsrhaft. Grund· 
btgriffe dtr ui!ltn So:iologie ( Lcipzig. 1887) . 8th. ed. (Lcipzig, 1935) . 
10 Sec t-brshall D . S1hlins, .. The Origin of Society, ·· Srirmific A mrricau, 20). No. ~ 
(September. 1960 ), 76-86. 
world is not an ··objective world"; it is a biologically conditioned 
world. A.nd if we are ready to admit the equivalence " reality = 
objective reality," the world in question is not a " real world." The 
reality proper to the biological world is determined by the sum of 
biological needs and impulses as shaped by a definite physical 
environment. The various biological worlds can be intertwined, 
and consti tute together one world-the so-called "world of the 
biosphere." But there is no world transcending these various 
worlds-no objectively transbio logica l world, that is. for an 
organic world to trespass beyond its own limits it would be neces-
sary for the individual organ isms belonging to it to stop, at least 
intermittently, acting accord ing to a defined challenge-and-response 
pattern. They wou ld have to be capable of refusing to fulfill 
biological demands fo r the sake of values of a more objective 
character. 
This is what human beings do-at times. They repress their 
biological drives in the name of possible actions having some end 
in themselves-for instance, in the name of knowing for knowing's 
sake. \Y/e may call the result o f these actions "cultural achieve-
ments" . Now, although such ach ievements must draw their energy 
out o f the sublimation of biological processes, they cannot be 
measured so lely in terms of th is sublimation. !vfax Scheler wrote 
that man is the only an imal capable of saying "No"-or, as he 
put it, he is "the ascetic of life." 11 But refusal is not enough; 
otherwise cul ture wou ld become a rather uncomfortable display 
of asceticism. And, in point of fact, cultme can also mean foster-
ing life, includ ing biological li fe. But in such a case, this is not 
to be done in the name of bio logical life (if it can be said that it 
is done .. in the name of" anything); it is to be done in the name 
of vital values. \'V'hat, therefore, ultimately counts, is not what 
the individual does, but the purpose with which he does it. A 
non-ascetic life permeated by va lues- for instance, by beauty-is 
as cultured as any other, and sometimes even more so. Thus, we 
must not hastily conclude that cu ltural values are solely obtainable 
by the repression and subl imation of biolog ical drives. Otherwise, 
they wou ld not necessari ly possess values of their own. At any 
rate, without some transformation of biological impulses there 
would be no possibility of an "objective world"; there would on ly 
be what I may call a "subjective-biolog ical 'vorld": the world of 
the species. 
11 l\hx Schckr, Die Stdlrmg drr Mmub•n im KottlltJI (D~rrnst3dt, 1!)28 ), p . 6:;. 
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To make one's own life can now be defined as follows: as 
the possibility of making the biological-subjective interests of the 
species, and of its individuals, serve as the energetic basis for the 
final recognition of objects as objects. This may in principle 
seem to lead to a type of existence in which the subjective drives 
of individual organisms are stifled never to recur again. Yet, the 
subservience of subjective-biological drives to objective realities 
andjor values need not be love's labor lost. The transformation 
of the self-enclosed biological world into an open objective 
world may be-it has, indeed, been-the necessary condition for 
a later much more effective fulfillment of biological impulses. 
The demands imposed upon men by the recognition of reality as 
objective reality have, in fact, led them to a mastery of the same 
biological world in which they were originally confined. Thus, to 
recognize reality as it is, and not as our wh im takes us, has 
become-through science for example-the most efficient means 
to mastering reality. One of tbe many paradoxes of the human 
condition is that men may have to emphasize reality to the 
utmost in order to fulfill more completely the demands of their 
subjectivity. 
Being, Becoming, Existi11g. 
The concepts thus far introduced can now be translated into 
an ontological vocabulary. Inorganic matter I will define as 
"being in itself," namely, being what it is. Organic reality I will 
define as "being for itself," namely being for the sake of its 
own fulfillment- of the development and su rvival of biological 
species. Inorganic matter I will conceive as "something that 
already is"; organic reality, as "something that is in process of 
being." In some sense, organic reality can also be conceived as 
" that which is not yet what it is." 
The term 'being' must not be construed here as designating 
something forbidding or recondite. In the present context 'being' 
means \vay of behaving'- in the general sense of 'way of being 
actualized.' To say that inorganic matter is already given is 
tantamount to saying that it is actual, or nearly so. The expres-
sion 'nearly so' I cannot adequately clarify here; it is sufficient 
to say that I am assuming the following ontological postulate: 
that no reality .is absolutely actual- and its counterpart : that no 
reality is absolutely potential. In my ontological scheme there 
is no room for absolute attributes (or entities) of any kind; there 
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.is at most .room for some pseudo-concepts-which then become 
limiting concepts-of absolute attributes or realities. Inorganic 
reality is, from this ontological viewpoint, the most actual of all 
types of reality. If it is not purely actual, it "behaves"-or rather, 
it appears- as if it were so. \.'lfhenever there is something deter-
minate, and determinable, that is the inorganic world. This is, 
be it said in passing, the reason why it lends itself so easily to 
description in that language in ·which, according to Galilee, the 
" Book of Natu re" is written: the language of mathematics. 
Inorganic realities undergo a number of states. O rganic 
realities, in particular the higher organized ones, undergo a 
number of phases. The former endure a series of processes; the 
latter, a series of developments. Terms such as 'state,' 'phase,' 
'process,' and 'development,' are, of course, utterly inadequate. 
f urthermore, the distinctions which these terms are meant to 
convey do not in any way presuppose that organic realities cease 
to behave i11 the way inorganic realities behave. After all, there 
is only one species of matter: the so-called "physical matter." 
But organic realities, or, as I have also called thcrn, "organisms," 
do something that inorganic realities do not: they realize them-
selves in the course of their development. They bring themselves, 
successfully or not, to an issue. They appear much more than 
inorganic reali ties, as a set of potentialities which may or may 
not become actual. In principle, an organism could be defined 
( ontologically) as a TO Ti iJv dvw - the Aristotelian expression, 
sometimes translated, rather hastily, as "essence." But of course, 
organ isms are not essences. They are existences developing 
accord ing to certain forms and patterns-which, no doubt, 
change in the course of evolution. In this sense, organisms 
are even more "determined" than inorganic realities-if the 
semantics of 'determined' is duly clarified. They possess, as 
an author has put it, a "determined fu ture," and abide by a 
"certa in generic and specific cycle." 12 Organic life has, thus, a 
"direction." Wlh ich, of course, does not mean, even if it seems 
to mean, that it always and necessarily follows a preconceived 
plan , or develops according to a preestablished finality. We need 
not presuppose the existence of immanent final causes in the 
evolution of the organ ic world as a whole. "'\J.f e need only pre-
suppose that organisms become what they are within a certain 
"See Pedro uin Entralgo. La nptrr. y lr. rsperr.11zr. (Madrid, 19}7). 2nd ed. (Modrid. 
19}8) . p. 479. 
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temporal-cyclical pattern, and according to certain laws of struc-
tural transformation. 
\'V'hen all is said, however, one thing remains certain: that 
both types of reality tally ( ontologically) with the concept of 
"being ." To be sure, one of these two types of reality is more 
aptly describable ( ontologically, again) as "becoming" rather 
than as "being." Yet, the concept of becoming is still indebted 
to the cono:pt of being. At any rate, both inorganic and organic 
realities can be understood as " things" of some sort- things 
which move and change; and things which, besides moving and 
changing, grow, develop, and reproduce themselves. 
The most striking characteristic of human life, as we view it 
ontologically, is that it can scarcely be ca lled "a being "- namely, 
"a thing." Walking, deliberately or not, in fichte's footsteps, 
some contemporary philosophers have emphasized that human 
life ctJ hmmm life is not a thing- not even a " thing that be-
comes." In the sense then in which I have employed such terms 
as 'to be,' 'being,' 'it is,' 'they are,' and so on , it can be said that 
human life, properly speaking, "is not." It is not what it is. But 
neither is it what it becomes. Can we then talk about it at all ? 
If we were too fussy about language, we should conclude that we 
obviously cannot. Happily enough, language is a very pliable 
affa ir ; we can make its terms mean, if not a ll thatl we want, at 
least some things that we very bad ly want. In consequence, we 
can also say that human life " is." But we must hasten to add that 
it is not a ··something," but rather a "someone." A few ph iloso-
phers have even gone so fa r as to define it as some sort of abso-
lute in which everything that is or becomes is enclosed- at least in 
so fa r as it is, or becomes, perceivable, knowable, and so on. I 
will not go with them. But I will admit at least th at if human 
life is some kind of thing, it is· a very strange thing indeed. T his 
thing that is not a thing, may be called "an existent"-not, how-
ever, in the sense of "something that exists," but rather in the 
sense partly uncovered by traditional metaphys icians when they 
coined for another purpose the expression " the pu re actuality of 
existing." 
Natural sciences and social sciences contribute wealthy and 
valuable information about human life. It would be stupid to 
dismiss all these sciences by a stroke of the pen by claiming that 
they on ly touch on the "ontic" realm while in no sense reaching 
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the "ontologie" realm, as Heidegger puts it.13 For these two 
realms are not incommunicable. It has been said that, after all, 
we are quite uncertain about where one such realm ends and 
where the other one begins.'' I heartily subscribe to this view. 
Translated into a more accessible vocabulary, it simply means 
that metaphysical speculation and ontological analysis, while 
they do not need to follo\v scientific research blindly, should 
never proceed extravagantly against scientific research. If for no 
other reason than that science is probably here to stay, philoso-
phers would do well to resign themselves to the fact that it may 
set certain bounds and exert certain controls on metaphysics ( the 
converse may, of course, also be the case) ! a The frontiers be-
tween metaphysics and science will eventually change; after all , 
neither one nor the other is a ready-made system of knowledge. 
Now, setting bounds to metaphysical speculation is far from 
equivalent to determining the direction that such speculation must 
take. Metaphysical speculation and, a fortiori. ontological analy-
sis use concepts wrought by science and by common sense, but 
do not meekly conform to the meanings establ ished by them. That 
this is so we will verify at once. I will introduce a few terms 
whose ontological meaning will prove to be quite different from, 
albeit somehow related to, the usual meaning. Among such terms, 
one is notably singled out for distinction: it is the term 'property,' 
cons idered here as designating the positive and concrete aspect 
of a yet undefined concept : the concept 'sel fhood'- a rather 
clumsy translation of the German 'Selbstheit' and of the Spanish 
'mismidc1d.' 
iHm? as selfbood and as property. 
To begin with, I will distinguish between 'ipseity' ('ipseitas' ) 
and 'selfhood.' The term 'ipseity' is meant to designate the fact 
that any g iven thing is what it is, namely the identy of any given 
thing with itself. Since such an identity is accomplished only 
when we arbitrarily disca rd the tempora l clement in a thing, pure 
"ipseity" is an attribute only of the so·called " ideal objects"-
ITtathematical entities (if there are such), concepts, and perhaps 
values. However, it can be said that all things as things display 
a greater or lesser tendency to being what they are, ancl therefore 
to being " identical" in the above sense. This tendency to self-
identity reaches its maximum in inorganic realities for reasons that 
'',\f. Hcideg~ter. S•in 111111 7.<•il .. I (l·b llc a .d. S .. 1927) . §·1 (p. 13 ) '"tl §10 (pp. 45 -50) . 
11 Jose Ortega y Gosset. 1-t~ irlra de prinril!io w Lribni: :; Itt fl•olrui<!n rlr Ia lrorfa 
rledurlm: (Madrid. 1958). §29 (p. 339 ) (En_,::hsh transbtion in prcp,ution) . 
"See my book PhiloJopby T odriJ (New York, 1960) pp. 159-67. 
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shou ld now be moderately clear. It is much less perceptible in 
organisms, in so far as these are in process of becoming what 
they are according to temporal and cyclical patterns. Neverthe-
less, all beings are in some ways what they are, even if at times 
their being is, to use the well-known Aristotelian expressions, a 
"coming-to-be" and a "passing-away." 
In a way the term 'selfhood' purports to designate a type of 
attribute similar to the one designated by the term 'ipseity.' 
Futhermore, if we define 'selfhood' as 'being itself and/or as 
'becoming itself,' then selfhood is just another form of identity. 
Thus, we may conclude that all realities, in so far as they are 
identical to themselves, possess the attributes of ipseity and 
selfhood. 
Unfortw1ately, all these terms behave like the meshes in 
Eddington's fishing-net: they Jet some interesting fish escape 
easily. At any rate, they let human reality jump into the sea 
again quickly. This happens in particu lar with the terms ·identity' 
and 'ipseity' . Does it also happen with the term 'selfhood'? Not 
necessarily, provided that we employ it the way scientists and, 
above all, philosophers handle a number of expressions-by 
twisting or, at least, stretching their meanings.1 6 'Selfhood' may 
mean more than just "being itself"; it may mean "being oneself." 
It m:ty serve as a formal answer to the question "Who is it?" 
rather than an answer to the question "\X/hat is it?" In this sense 
it may describe a specifically human attribute. In order to avoid 
confusions, however, I propose the following terminological de-
vice: whenever 'selfhood' is applied to human beings, I wi ll call 
it "property"-in a sense of 'property' whid1 I will soon clarify. 
Besides being denounced as barbaric, the present vocabulary 
will in all likelihood be declared superfluous. Why not use in 
th is connection the more respectable terms 'spirit' and 'person,' 
already tested through centuries of philosophical experience? The 
term 'person' in particular looks quite handy. Yet, 1 prefer to 
avoid it-or rather, to use it only after it has been purged of 
many of its traditional connotations. Should the occasion arise 
we could, if we badly wanted to, use the terms 'spirit' and 
'person' provided that the two following conditions were ful-
,. Twisting and stretching the meaning of trrrns borrowed from common speech is. of 
course. on ly pat t of the story. It is necessary th>t meaninl!·twistings and meaning-extensions 
should not function in r'"''"· See .. among many other contemporary writing~ in this ~cspect, 
H. A. Hodces. l.Anp.uageJ, StandpomiJ, and Atll!fldtJ (l..:>ndon, 1953). pp. 17- 18 (Un l\·ers•ty 
o f Durh>m. Riddell Memorial Lecture~. T wenty-fourth Series). Among clauica l warninss 
against illcgitim>tc meaning-twistings and meaning-extensions Berkeley is still the most 
valu>ble. 
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filled: First, that these terms do not refer to any reality absolutely 
transcendent to human life, and sti ll less running counter to the 
material-inorganic and organic- constituents of human life. 
Second, that they do not designate any indissoluble and inalien-
able attributes-namely, any supposedly eternal predicates which 
man would, so to speak, ''share," and of which he could be 
definitely assured. By the way, simi lar reservations could be made 
when the atributes of "ration:tlity" and "emotivity" (some higher 
forms of crnotivity at least) are chosen as denoting spcctfic char-
acteristics of human existence. 
At most 1 will agree to say that man becomes persounl and 
becomes spiri/u({l- ·without ever completely succeeding. 1\fan is 
making himself constantly as man-and that is what I meant by 
saying that "he makes his own life." A certain biological struc-
ture and a number of psychological dispositions a rc in th is respect 
necessary, bu t not sufficient, conditions. They are in no way 
mere ly contingent facts-purely circumstantial elen1ents wh ich 
man can take or leave as he pleases. A certain human body and 
a certain human mind are also a certain g iven man. Each man thus 
makes his own life with his body and his mind. whid1 are not 
solely "things," but basic elements of man's existence. 
H ere lies one reason why human beings are not identical with, 
even if in some respects they arc comparable to, servomechan isms. 
Jt is gui tc probable that the more we know about th e structure 
and the behavior of nervous systems-and above all , about the 
structure of the human central nervous system- the more similar 
they will appear to be to a complex servomechanism. The psycho-
somatic structure of human beings can be largely explained in 
terms of complicated mechanical st:ttes in stable equi librium. The 
so-called ' 'organic self-control" (homeostasis) can be described 
as a kind of thermostatic control. W/ e may even go so far as 
to admit that servomechanisms c:tn think, remember, learn, and 
so on. \X/hen all is said, however, there still remains the problem 
of whether a servomechanism, no matter how human-like we 
imagine it to be, can indeed perform operations of a reall y human 
character. Professor Mario Bunge has pointed out that " irrespect-
ive of their degree of automatism [ computers] arc all cha racter-
ized by the fact that they do no! perform 11lfllbematicttl opertt-
tiom. but only physica l operations which we coordinate with 
mathematical ones."1; Computers "do not add pure numbers; 
they add turns of cogwheels. electric pulses, etc."18 Th::tt some 
" ?-hrio nun~:e. "un Computer< Think?" in Mnauirr.lifir Qurrio (Sprins:field, Ill., 
19)9). p. 129 (Amerir•n U<ture Series. ~·II). 
'"Op. ril., p. 133. 
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f~ncti?ns can ?e described in terms of automatic control opera-
tions ts one thtng; that they are identical with such operations is 
another. In any case, it would be pure fantasy to claim that 
servomechanisms make themselves the way human beinas do· b , 
that, therefore, they belong to themselves. This does not mean 
that servomechanisms could not in principle reproduce themselves 
- if von Neumann's blueprint for a self-reproducing machine 
proves feasible we will eventually assist at such a stupendous 
ceremony- ;19 it only, bu t significantly, means th at their reality 
will never be theirs, bu t something else's, and actually someone 
el se's reality. 
"Man belongs to himself' is a way, albeit a rather awkward 
one, of saying that man is his own property. I do not only mean 
the fact that the body and the mind of human beings belong to 
them, instead of being someth ing alien and contingent. I also, 
and above all, mean that men possess their own lives, so tbat they 
are ontologically, and not only morally, responsible for them-
selves. Man is not a being thrtt lives ; he is Mr ow11 living . How-
ever, since man is not anyth ing definite except the constant effort 
to become man, it may even be risky to say that he is his own 
living ; let us then say thnt he constantly tries to make his living 
his own. :Making one's own life-for this is ultimately what all 
this boils down to-is then something different from, although 
somehow correlated to, the biological processes of g rowing and 
developing. \\7hat such ·· sel f·making" most resembles is a series 
of effo rts to reach and, as it were, to conquer one's ovm rea lity 
wh ile stumbling a ll a long the way. 
T he above may cast some light on the perplexing paradox 
of man as a free being. On the one hand , m:tn as man is neces· 
sa rily free. The arguments adduced in favor of this view by 
authors such as Ortega y Gasset/0 Sartre,~ 1 and so on are quite 
10 See John G. Kemeny, "~bn Viewed os ~ }.-flchi ne," Sritlltifir Amrrirmr, 192, No. 4 
(Apri l. 19>> ). >S..U7. 
« jose O rtet:a y G•sset. T ht R.rrolt of thr Ma;us. Jomes Cleu_,;h. trans. (New York, 
19H). I'· 52. See my book. Ortrg<J 1 G,turt . An Outlinr of /111 Pbiloso('hJ (London . 
1956 & Kew Ho,·en. 1957) . pp. )2-3. 
" Jean·PJul Slrtre. L' F.rr,• tl l r .'\1"111 ( Plris. 19-l.;) Qultril·me pHtie. chlp. I (pp. 
508-612 ). It should be noted tlut. de3pite his odhcsion to lll orxism. Sott.re hos not con · 
sicler.bly chonged his views on the " primacy of freedom" in m~n. even ~ur10.1: the so·c~ll~d 
" rcriod of explo itation." So11re only or,;ucs now th at such freedom <!Jspt.ys. 1tself w1th1n 
.. 3 certlin g iven conditioning e-nvironment. ·· " Pour nous. l"homme sc car:tctCrtse av:.tnt tout 
par lc dcpHsemcnt d'une situation . pJr ce qu ' il porvient 3 fa ire de ce. qu'on a fait de lui" 
(Critil(uC de /.~ raitt>n rlhtlutil(ut. Vol . 1: J'hiorir dn mumbles f> rnltfpct, !'oriS ,. 1960 . .P· 
63. ) At any ro te, not. onlf S:~rt!e's .. Marx,ism" is cx.p,cssed in an .u n nll .lt~bbly Extste.nt!l lt~t 
lnnlluogc. but Sartrc h1msc f cln un< thnt Ius la ter op.n tons can castl y be mtcp,roted w1th h ts 
earlier ones. Incidentally. Hcidc~f(cr makes s imilar cl aims in rCS!>CCt to the rel?tion between 
h is " co rl ier" a nd h is " later" philosoph ies (see Unterwegt zur Spr11dJC [ l'fu llmgen, 1959). 
pp. 85-155. a nd cspt'cially 98-!) ). 
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pertinent, even if they are not always altogether convincing. On 
the other hand, freedom is not g iven to man in the sense in which 
it might be g iven to a thing as one of its unassailable attri butes. 
i\s a consequence, the paradox of freedom is still more puzzling 
than has often been cla imed. Let me put it this way: man 
acquires his own freedom in so far as he freely develops as man. 
Thus, freedom is a requisite for the existence of man ... who 
must himself produce this requisite. i\lan is that type of reality 
that can make itself while it can also unma ke itself. Man, in 
short, has the possibil ity of being himself, and of not being him-
self, of appropriat ing himself and of alienating himself. 
Human reality is, therefore, a ''being for itself' in a much 
more radical sense than the being for itself proper to organisms. 
No organic re::llity as such can move away from itself. Ceasing 
to be itself is for such a reality equivalent to becoming another. 
To use, and by the way to distort, the Hegelian vocabulary-to 
wh ich I and many others are indebted nowadays, no matter l.ow 
much we try to put it out of ou r head-an organic reality is never 
an Anderssein, and can never become properly an Amsersicbsein. 
If we persist in applying the expressions 'being for itself and 
'being other' to the behavior of organ ic rea lities, it is w ith quite 
different meanings in mind. In discussing hun1an reality onto-
logically we a rc not interested in forms of being as being but in 
ultimate possibilities of existence. \ \lhereas organic reality can 
be in many d iO'erent ways, it never ceases to be what it is. On 
the other hand, man can cease to be himself and as a rule never 
becomes entirely himself. Yet, not being l1imself is also one of 
the ways of being a man. The reason for this paradoxica l con-
clition of human existence is, agai n, that man is never ct "thing 
that is." 
It may now be contended that I have gone indeed too far in 
my attempt to deny that man is a ''being" or a "thing." first, 
man is also a thing-an organic thing, and man)' inorganic things 
together. Second, we may view man, from the religious angle, as 
a creature-therefore, as a type of reality th:1t could never make 
his own existence, or even simply exist, unless God produced him, 
and perhaps helped him to exist. Such clain1s arc not lightly to 
be dismissed. The former one is based upon facts; the latter one 
is founded on a belief. Nevertheless, I need not consider these 
claims as unduly embarrassing. The first claim I have already 
rebutted; although man, through his body and mind, is a fact, or 
I '> 
a coUection of facts, what makes him a man are not these facts 
but what he does with them. In human life it is the rneanina of 
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the facts that counts. As to the second claim, it is sufficient to 
say that even if man received his being from God, it could still be 
argued that he is not properly a man un less he maintains himself 
it: existence. If man is a created being, he is such in a sense quite 
dtfferent from the one in which we say that th ings, or for that 
matter, pure spirits, are created. The freedom that constitutes 
man and by means of which he constitutes himself must be h is 
very own. T o express it in Nietzsche's language: man is like 
an acrobat walking over an abyss;~~ it is up to him to fling 
himself down or to keep his balance. In order to be able to 
walk over the abyss with a reasonable degree of poise he does a ll 
sorts of th ings-for example, he creates "culture" and "history." 
There is J ittle doubt that "part of every cu lture is ·defense-
mechanism'," and that " the function of culture and psychosis 
alike is to be 'homeostatic', to maintain preferred equilibriums." 23 
But this is only part of the story. As I have tried to establish, 
cu lture is also, and above all, t11e result of the attempt to make 
man's world an objective world, independent from, albeit attached 
to, his basic drives and instincts. There is no hann , however, in 
admitting that n1an is fundamentally a cul tural and historical 
being. He does not produce culture and history just because he 
finds it fun, but because he bad ly needs them. But this question 
leads us to the end of our metaphysical journey, for it is the 
problem of "where" man is heading that wi ll occupy us in the 
last few pages. 
T be cle finition of mrm. 
let me brie~y recapitulate my argument. The concepts "being" 
and "becoming" apply to human reality only in so far as this 
reality is part of a continuum-the continuum of Nature. I have 
never denied , but rather emphasized th at mao is also an inorganic 
and an organic being, to the e.xtent that he reaLLy is matter and 
body rather than just having them. But as we wisb to d istinguish 
hw11an realities ontologically from the other realities of the said 
continuum, the ontological vocabulary must be stretched when it 
is not hvisted . Thus, terms such as 'sclfhood,' 'property,' and 
'' Litc.,lly, n t i~tht·ropc walker (ein Sri/tan~tr). " Ocr Menss~ ist ~in .Sci I, ~te.k~iipft 
zwischen Tier und Ubcrmcosch-ein Scil iihcr cmcm Abgrundc. Etn gdahrltches Hmuber, 
ein gef:ihrlichcs Auf-dem-W'egc, cin gcbhrlichcs Zurilckblickcn. cin gef:ihrlichcs Schaudcrn 
11nd Stchcnblcibcn· ... cine Briicke unci kein Zwcck . .. " (Also sprach Znrathnstrtt. 
Zltnthustrns Vorredc, 4. lf/erke in drei Blind en, K ' rl Schlcchtn, ed., II [Miinchen , 1956). 
281 }. 
""Weston L1 Barre, op. cit. [Note 6], p. 246. 
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others come to the rescue in order to allow us to have a glimpse 
of what it means to say such odd things as "man is not a being, 
but a maker of himself." 
I could have also said that the reality of human life is, properly 
speaking, the meaning of human life if I had been given the 
opporhmity to introduce the term 'meaning' (or perhaps 'sense') 
with any likelihood of not being utterly misunderstood. I will 
confine myself to a less controversial vocabulary, and will say that 
human reality is "intentional" in character. 'Being intentional' 
here means 'going toward, wending or directing one's course.' 
But a question now arises: where is he going? where is he wend-
ing or directing his course? 
If I say 'toward something outside of him,' or 'toward some-
thing inside of him,' I will not go very far indeed. To proceed 
to the outside is tantamount to adapting to the surrounding world 
-a world in turn constantly shaped by the adaptive efforts. T o 
proceed to the inside is tantamount to self-regulating the individ-
ual structure. In both cases we :1re talking about biological and 
bio-psychological processes . These have, in man and in higher 
animals, a firm basis in two types of nervous system: the 'cerebro-
spinal' nervous system, which coordinates the knowledge and 
action relations with the external world; and the sympathetic 
nervous system, which regul ates the so· called ·· inner processes" 
of the organism and which is split in as many independent systems 
as prove necessary for the proper functioning of the various parts 
of the organism. \'X!here, then, does man as man proceed to? No 
doubt, we can sti ll use such expressions as 'toward the outside' 
and 'toward the inside,' but the terms 'outside' and 'inside' acquire 
a quite different meaning here. 
The "outside" toward which human beings proceed is the 
world as a world, namely the world as an objective reality, inde-
pendent in principle of purely biological and psycho-biological 
needs, and at times even running counter to such needs. This 
'' intentional opening" to the objective world, as phenomenologists 
would put it, is the foundation of knowledge. To be sure, men 
know and think to some purpose. But the contents of thinking 
and knowledge must be objectiveLy valid , and not only subjec-
tively useful. Human beings project themselves toward a world 
outside that transcends any subjective purpose. Human beings 
may have, so to speak, inventec.l and promoted knowledge for 
the sake of life. But here we can modify a celebrated formula: 
17 
propte1' cognitiouew cognitionis perdere camrts; we must sacrifice 
knowledge (knowledge as a vital tool) for the sake of knowl-
edge (knowledge as an end). Or, rather, we must promote the 
former only because we hope to reach the latter. This docs not 
mean, of course, that knowledge as an end is necessarily incom-
patible with knowledge as a tool ; after all, action has often been 
all the more successful when disinterested contemplation has 
preceded it. On the other hand, knowing is not the only possible 
intentional attitude; evaluating is also important, and sometimes 
even more so than knowing. In any case, man exists as man in so 
far as he fuLfils himself not by directly responding to the chal-
lenges of the environment, but by making the environment an 
objective world. Therefore, when man proceeds toward an 
outside, he does not confine himself either to adapting to it 
completely, or to refusing it completely. He goes back and forth 
from subjectivity to objectivity-which helps explain why the 
cultural world, which man creates as he springs up from the 
natural world, is at the same time a world which he must 
objectively recognize. 
On the other hand, the '"inside" toward which man wends 
his way is not only the inner biological or bio-psychologica l 
structure. It is not equival ent to, even if it is based on, the 
p rocess of self-conservation and self-regulation of the organ ism. 
but some sort of reality which may be called the "oneself," 
"one's own reality," and also "one's authenticity." There is a lso 
a projecting movement here. But then man does not project 
something; he rather projects "someone"-himself. \'{!hen he 
thus projects himself, man searches for-without necessarily 
finding-his "authentic being," or, as it has al so been called, 
rather pathetically, his "destiny." To be sure, a ll realities, and 
in particular all organisms, exist in some way as self-fulfilling 
and self-projecting realities; they all are, consciously or not, 
intent on realizing themselves. Dut whereas the pattern for self-
realization is given to them in the forms and la'''S of nature, 
man is not given any such definite pattern. Each one of us 
finds his own pattern, without knowing whether it wi ll ever be 
discovered, or even whether there is one. All realities, except 
man can be or can become. Man can, besides, cease to be-in 
' ' the sense of "ceasing to be himself." Here is why the concepts 
"being" and "becoming" have proved inadequate t~ describe 
ontologically huma n reality. In that sense Sartre was n ght when 
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he contended that human life-or "consciousness," the "being-
fo r itself"- is not what it is, and is what it is not. In view of 
this, we could now assert that man is not even doomed to be 
free. Man is not properly speaking doomed to anythi ng, not 
even to be a man. This docs not necessarily mean that freedom 
is neither good nor bad. In fact, unless he is- or rather struggles 
to become--free, man is not worthy of being called a human 
being. But he does not receive his freedom ready-made ; he makes 
it. O r, more precisely: he makes it as he ( freely) makes himself. 
Th is is, of course, a deplorable vicious circle, fo r it comes to 
saying that only freedom makes possible a certain type of reality 
... wh ich makes itself throug h freedom. But I see no way of 
escaping this vicious circle. It may ·we ll happen, by the way, 
that some vicious circles are philosophically inescapable . O n the 
level of the ontology of human li fe, we must often acknowledge 
that some conseguences may play at the same time the role of 
principles. 
Huma n life can be defined as a kind of unceasing march 
towa rd oneself, ·which can often become a march against oneself. 
Paradoxically, not being oneself is as good an attribute of human 
life as being oneself. 
This is the meanLng of the attribute " property"- that human 
Life is ahvays man's own life. Man owns his life even when 
he seems to be on the verge of annihilating himself as ma n-
whethe r to go back to his purely anin1al living, or to transcend 
himself and become, as it were, ecstatic in front of pure objec-
tivity. This last point deserves brief elucidation. Let us imagine 
th at man consists, as some say, in being a spiri tual substance, and 
that such a substance is defined as the possibility of bowi ng to 
objectivity- to objective reality and to objective values. Even 
in such a mse, spiritual rea lity cannot be conceived unless as 
existing. And in o rde r to exist it must undergo all sorts of 
experiences- private and public ; personal and histo rical. T o 
live as a man is to undergo what makes one to be what one is. 
As a conscguence, man as a person tends to yield to the imper-
sonal, but he is no longer a man when he yields to the impersonal 
to the point of fusing with it. This is, of course, another pa radox 
which, I am afraid, I must leave. Let me simply say that man 
continua ll y hesitates between the realm of pure objectivity and 
the rea lm of pu re internal experience. He cannot come to a 
halt in his constant sh ift from one extreme point to the other. 
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Reality and values are objective to man only in so far as they 
are subjectively experienced. Human experience, on the other 
hand, is lived through what some philosophers have called "situa-
tions." And since situations, whether individual or collective, 
are historical in character, human living is always historical, 
namely, irreversible, and in some sense at least, "dramatic." 
Anytl1ing done, thought, or felt by man in order to live authen-
tically is irretrievable. It may be claimed that some acts or deci-
sions sink so deeply in the living root of human reality that they 
can transform it from the ground up. As an example I may cite 
repentance--usually followed by conversion. In contradistinction 
to mere remorse,~·• repentance makes some kind of spiritual 
rebirth possible. The past is not actually wiped away, but it 
becomes so transfigured by the present as to make it appear 
entirely different from what it was. Yet, even these "extreme 
situations" are possible only because the facts which they trans-
form have existed the way they did . Jn other words, for repent-
ance to be even conceivable, something to repent from is neces-
sary. The very possibility of a fundamental change in human 
life is based on life's basic irreversibi lity. No human act is 
entirely alien to man. Hence the dramatic character of human 
existence. I do not inject the word 'dramatic' here just because 
I wish to make the readers shudder-for I feel certain that the 
readers, if they happen to be philosophers, will never shudder. 
I use the term 'dramatic' only to emphasize the temporal, exper-
iential and historical character of human reality. To say "life 
is a drama," on the other hand, is one of the ways of saying 
" life is mine." No drama is such if it is not the exclusive 
property of the character who displays it. 
The source out of which the "dramatic" actions and decisions 
of human individuals spring is, therefore, no purely spiritual, 
intelligible, and, least of all, permanent nature. Ortega y Gasset 
has pointed out that human life is at all times circumstantial ;25 
each man does what he does-or abstains from doing what he 
abstains from doing-in view of specific and very concrete 
circumstances. I agree, but with one important reservation. 
Ortega y Gnsset thought- as did Sartre later-that the body and 
mind ( the character and temperament) of man belonged to the 
:• On the difference between repentance and remo rse.. sec Vhdimir Jonke!evitcb. LA 
TIIIIIIVttisu tonuitnro (PHis, 1951 ) , pp. 94-107, •nd especonlly 9·1-5 . 
•• Sec my book on Ortega y Gasset (Note 20]. PI'· 26-7 . 49. 
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circumstances of human life, so that man made his choice with, 
and, if necessary, against his own body and mind. If such were 
the case, however, the human reality would boil down to pure 
nothingness. The body and mind of a human individual would 
never be his own. He would become a disembodied ghostly 
"chooser." Furthermore, he would be an infinitely plastic and 
malleable reality. By dint of making every natural reality in him 
appear as a purely contingent "facticity" (as Sartre puts it), the 
very human reality would entirely dissolve. By means of depriv-
ing man of everything, he would not even be someone who 
would act with, for or against any circumstances. On the other 
hand, if we conclude that only man's body and mind constitute 
man, we again risk making man a thing among other similar 
things. I will now turn to this difficulty as a preface to my .final 
definition of man. 
Some philosophers have tried to determine "who" ultimately 
man is as distinct from ascertaining '"what" he is. A few have 
said, moreover, that man is his irreducible "authenticity," his 
" inner call" (Heidegger) , his "destiny." And they have added 
that we may choose to be faithful or not to our "incorruptible 
core." Theirs is an exquisite and relined doctrine. It is not, 
however, a very illuminating doctrine. To say that "whoness" 
(if I may be allowed to use this word) is equivalent to authen-
ticity and nothing else, is to put forward a purely nominal 
definition of the expression 'oneself.' It is equivalent to saying 
that one is (at bottom) what one (at bottom) is. No conse-
'1uences, moral or otherwise, ensue. Some other philosophers have 
.trguecl that in view of the above difficulty, it is preferable to sub-
:;cribc to some more traditional definition of man- at any rate, 
to any formula defining man as a really permanent "someone." 
But when these phi losophers have started defining or describing 
3uch supposedly more enduring reality, they have been caught in 
the trap of all classical substantinlist theories. They have been 
compelled to define man as some kind of " invariable nature"-
and often as someone possessing an "intelligible (or rational) 
core." In other words, they have again defined human reality 
in terms of such categories as "th ing" and "being" which I have 
taken so many pains to discard. 
Is the question at all solvable? The general ontological 
framework that supports all my philosophical views and that I 
must again leave unexplained comes to the rescue. In this onto-
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logical framework no absolutes-and hence no absolute modes 
of being- are allowed. Each reality is supposed to bend towards 
some of the so-called absolutes without ever reaching it. Now, 
the infinite plasticity and malleability of the human reality, on 
the one hand, and its invariable and permanent character on the 
o ther hand are absolute modes of being. As such, they a re only 
limiting realities describable by means of l imiting-concepts. We 
can talk about them, but only if we a re careful enough to allow 
them a mere quasi-existence. Thus, concrete human reality per-
petually oscillates between two ideal poles. Man is not to be 
defined either as a pure possibility of choice or as a purely 
invariable entity; he unceasingly rebounds from one end to the 
other in order to make himself. Human reali ty is not like an 
unbordered river. Neither is it comparable to a waterless river-
bed . It is not pure nature. Neither is it pure history. It is both, 
but in a constantly shift ing-perhaps I should say, "dialectica l" 
- way. 
In some respects I have tried to put traditional metaphysics 
and modern ontology together. The former insisted on substance; 
the latter has emphasized function. T he former argued in favor 
of a " rational" or, at least, "intel ligible" core of man; the latter 
has underlined "history," "experience," and "drama." If we now 
reintroduce the tin1e-honorecl term 'person' and try to put it to 
some use, could we not say that the unforeseeable and irretriev-
able histo ry of the human being is inscribable within the frame 
of the notion of pe rson? \VIe would not then· say that man is a 
person having a history, but rather a person constituting itself 
historically. According to the venerable formula, the human 
person is "an individua l substance of a rational character,"20 
subsisting thus in its own right and as a communicable realit}'· 
Provided that we interpret the term ·substance,' in the light of 
the preceding considerations, as a self-making reality, we can 
conclude that man is "an individual substance of a historical 
character." It is most improbable that my formu la will ever 
become as influential as Boethius'. But perhaps it is because 
phi losophers are nowadays harder to please. 
I began with a quotation from Descartes. I may as well end 
with another- also slightly modified: " I have been plunged into 
so many doubts by this meditation that it is no longer in my 
:6 '' Ptrsona nl naturat ratiDJIItlis inJi1'iJ11a JtlbstaJttitt'' (Bocthius, Dt tl!lab111 natrnis 
t1 tma fJ<rJona Chrilli, 3 [PL., 6<1 , col. 13•1)]). 
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power to forget them; nor can I see by what means they might 
be resolved. I am as confused as if I had suddenly fallen into 
deep water and was able neither to plant my feet on the bottom 
nor to swim to the surface again:•:; 
"Mtditathmn d• prim11 philosophhz. Meditatio II (AT VII 23-4) . The correct ori~:in:tl 
text reads: "In t:tnt a< dubitn tiones hastt:rn:t mcdit::atione conj cctu s sum. ut nequeJm nmpl ius 
elrum obli\' isci . nee videam tamen qu:t r:'ltionc solvend:te s int: sed, t:tnqu:tm in ~rofundum 
gurgitus ex improviso debpsus, ita tuzbatus sum, ut nee possim in imo pedem ligeze. nee 
en:1t2re :.tc.l s-ummum. · · 
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